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Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800110030-6

12 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conference with Andrew Marshall, NSC Staff

1. I met this date with Andy Marshall in his office at EOB for a 90-minutes conference. Captain George Pickett of Andy's staff also was present. The primary subject was the content of the paper on the India-Pakistan crisis study which Andy is to prepare for the NSCIC Working Group for forwarding to the NSCIC.

2. I noted that only Dr. Cline had proposed any specific changes to the draft memorandum previously submitted to the Working Group for consideration, and Dr. Cline's changes focused primarily on committing the Working Group to "initiating a detailed analysis of lessons learned with a view of preparing recommendations for improved procedures." I felt, however, that the wide-ranging nature of the comments made on the India-Pakistan paper at the 6 July Working Group meeting gave Andy quite a free hand in revising the draft memorandum for the NSCIC chairman.

3. I suggested that he might concentrate on two aspects of the problems cited in the India-Pakistan study: first, the need for improvement of communications channels, and, second, some means of improving the mechanism for development of community positions concerning intentions or objectives of participants in a crisis situation. Andy said he intended to talk with various members of the Working Group to identify the problem areas he should talk about.

4. With respect to the expression of community judgments on intentions and objectives, I suggested he might consider proposing that during crisis situations, ONE establish an ad hoc group, including community representation, which would function full-time and prepare SNIEs as necessary to maintain the currency of community judgments as the situation evolved. This would not put ONE in the current intelligence business, but would provide a means by which policy makers could be kept aware of intelligence community judgments on major facets of the crisis situation.

5. Andy said he did not consider the ONE style of writing was adequate for such purposes. In his view, ONE writing is deliberately fuzzy and does not convey the clear and distinct expression of views needed by decision makers.

6. He recognized that much depends on the image intelligence personnel have of their role and whether they are willing to make judgments which are recognizably related to the policy problems under active consideration.

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7. Andy asked what I envisioned might be covered by an examination of the communications process, and I said that this is an old and complex problem, but I felt the study should properly be limited to an examination of the intelligence side of the issue -- how well and with what timeliness is intelligence communicating its products to the user, and how could these channels be improved. This would face up to the issue of "clogging the channels."

8. Andy felt that to be useful any such study should go beyond this and determine whether the message actually was getting through to the recipient. The problem would be to understand how and to what extent information actually reaches individual top leaders, which goes far beyond merely ascertaining what arrives in their offices. He was visualizing case studies of ongoing situations rather than a review of past activities.

9. Andy cited earlier conversations with [] concerning the extent to which the intelligence community was wedded to the written word even though new techniques and technologies such as TV "newscasts" and picturephones might enable more direct contact with users.

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10. In Andy's view, any study of intelligence communications should look at "communication" in the broadest manner and include consideration of the receptivity of the user's mind to acceptance of the intelligence product. He has not thought of who might be participants in such a study, but he considers that a key element will be "watching things while they happen" to learn how things get done. I noted the manpower load might be considered excessive, and he conceded there might be reasons for not doing such a study.

11. We discussed the matter of feedback from users to intelligence producers, and Andy's view was that his attempts to increase feedback had not shown much receptivity at the intelligence end. He said the primary reaction has been a "bristling" or a comment to "get it in writing from Mr. Kissinger" without much else happening.

12. He asked if I had given further consideration to additional ways of soliciting guidance from top-level policy makers. This was a follow-on to earlier discussions we had had on the [] project. I told Andy we were in the preliminary stages of preparing for review of the DCID 1/2, but had made no specific plans for contracting people outside the intelligence community. I noted that the DCI still had no response from Mr. Kissinger on his request of last February 24th for comment on DCID 1/2, to which Andy reminded me he had provided copies of informal comments from NSC staff members even though the formal response still was on Mr. Kissinger's desk.

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13. Andy raised the matter of "deception" and referred to his comment in the final paragraph of his transmittal memorandum on the India-Pakistan study in which he had cited the need for alertness against the use of deception. He was concerned, for instance, that WSAG minutes clearly showed considerable weight was given to statements by Indian officials without any apparent concern as to the opportunity for deception contained in such statements. He inquired whether intelligence analysts are given any training to alert them to deception practices or to describe past efforts made to deceive U.S. intelligence. I said I had raised this subject briefly last April and had been assured that an alertness to deception was part and parcel of the evaluation techniques used by CIA analysts. Andy is not certain whether he wants to make a point on deception in his draft paper to the NSCIC Working Group, and I told him I would check with CIA/OTR and with DIA to see whether deception practices are covered in training courses for analysts and whether evaluations had been made as a follow-on to situations in which efforts had been made to deceive the U.S.


14. Andy described a conversation with [] (NSC Staff, Operations Section, Europe) who considers intelligence should make an effort to systematically ascertain how Soviet representatives use their U.S. contacts, particularly in the academic and scientific fields, to push for particular propaganda objectives and how this "line" changes over time. Andy agreed with [] that such a project would be interesting and could provide information as to what the USSR is interested in finding out about this country as well as the line of thought they are interested in selling to Americans. I said I was not familiar with any studies which indicated how well we were able to do this, but it struck me as being part of the normal responsibilities of counterintelligence organizations. (Check with [] to see if they attempt to correlate reports from difference sources to determine the extent to which the USSR uses its various U.S. contacts to pursue a particular propaganda line or gives any evidence of seeking the same kinds of information from a variety of U.S. sources.)

15. Andy asked what had come from earlier conferences with the Psychological Services Staff, which he understood were intended to utilize the services of [] and others as part of the production improvement program. I told him [] had advised me that during my absence in Europe, Mr. Colby and Mr. Tweedy had discussed this, after which Mr. Tweedy had instructed [] not to proceed further pending additional word from him. [] had telephoned me last week, however, so evidently he is available and I intend to raise with Mr. Tweedy a proposal that we proceed with development of a specific project using the PSS staff.

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
16. Andy also asked what had happened to the study Ed Proctor had agreed to make concerning economic intelligence activities by agencies outside the normal intelligence community. I described what Maurice Ernst had been doing to enlarge his EIC apparatus and reported Maurice had requested USIB authority to accomplish the study requested by the NSCIC Working Group. I agreed to check with Maurice and give Andy a progress report.



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Chief, PRG/IC

Distribution:

- orig - PRG subject (filed)
- 1 - Mr. Tweedy
- 1 - Mr. Marshall
- 1 -  chrono
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ILLEGIB

15 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conference with Andrew Marshall, NSC Staff, This Date

1. My conversation with Andy concerned essentially four topics:

- a. How to convey to intelligence producers the dissatisfaction of Mr. Kissinger and the NSC Staff with the present product.
- b. A better means of expressing consumer interest in general categories of intelligence than is presently available
- c. Andy's and my reaction to the [] proposal.
- d. The [] project.

2. Andy expressed great concern that he is unable to convey to CIA the depth of Mr. Kissinger's dissatisfaction with the political analyses being disseminated. He does not feel it would be desirable to put this in writing but he considers that his oral comments have not evoked any response and it is his impression that [] the CIA liaison officer at the White House, is equally unsuccessful. I suggested that if Mr. Kissinger really is unhappy with the quality of political evaluations, it might be appropriate for him personally to discuss this matter on an informal basis with the DCI.

4. Andy used this occasion to return to his criticism of the SS-9 study which was made at his request. He is having another meeting on this with Ed Proctor on 16 June to discuss the worthwhileness of a new study which would attempt to assess the impact which various institutional and decision-making constraints have had on the development of a particular Soviet weapon system. This was Andy's intent in requesting the SS-9 study but he considers the end product did not represent this kind of an approach.

Andy said Mr Kissinger no longer read political assessments sent to him because he considered them too stereotyped and shallow in nature to be worthwhile. Andy said he has avoided putting things in writing, and wondered whether the DCI would really want such, current info is seeking advice as to how he actually has any

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5. Andy reported that Mr. Kissinger still has not signed off on either the DCID 1/2 comments or on Andy's request for authority to draft a statement of NSC intelligence needs. Andy is concerned that the DCID format is not adaptable to accommodating changing trends in the level of U.S. interest in particular subjects. I indicated that the priority assigned to the objectives by country represented a current assessment of what the future trends might be, but that the DCID 1/2 really paid primary attention to the priority which applied to objectives for the upcoming budget year and that annual changes were to be accommodated by revision of the DCID. I also said that discussion of trends which would expand or diminish intelligence interest in particular areas would be covered in the planning guidance which [] is charged with preparing.

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6. With respect to [] proposal that collectors could list their problem areas and submit these to top level consumers for guidance, I again reiterated to Andy that the contact should be between production organizations and consumers rather than have collectors working with consumers. I told him it was not my intention in the memorandum of 16 May to limit this consumer/producer contact to formal written statements, and I recognized the need for two-way communication and feedback.

7. Andy is still of a mind that the ALPHA element of [] project should be given further consideration as a means of developing a statement of consumer needs for general types of intelligence. I recognized that the DELPHI approach used by [] is a promising one but I expressed concern at the results which were recorded in this year's ALPHA exercise and indicated that if these were actually taken as true indication of U.S. interest in various types of intelligence, a very marked change in the way intelligence operates and the kinds of information on which collection activities focus would seem to be in order in view of the relatively small values given to military intelligence.

8. Andy raised the subject of the availability of information on the academic background of intelligence analysts and I told him I would inform him as to the kinds of information which have been entered into the computers. I told him it had been our understanding that nothing further was to be done until he asked for it.

[]
Chief, PRG/IC

Distribution:
orig - Mr. Tweedy

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